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ADMIRALTY LAW 
INSTITUTE OF LONDON UNDERWRITERS 
v. SEA-LAND SERVICES, INC.: GOOD 
THINGS DO NOT ALWAYS COME IN 
SMALL PACKAGES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Institute of London Underwriters v. Sea-Land Services, 
Inc./ the Ninth Circuit determined the effect of the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA)2 when it is incorporated by contract 
for goods not ordinarily within COGSA's scope rather than if it 
applied ex proprio vigore. 3 The court held that in such a con-
tract, COGSA is effective as a contractual term only; inconsis-
tent terms are, therefore, also valid.' 
The Ninth Ciruit then set forth a method by which to calcu-
late a customary freight unit (CFU) for on-deck cargo I! because 
COGSA limits damage liability to $500 per "package" or CFU.6 
1. Institute of London Underwriters v. Sea-Land Serv., 881 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(per Goodwin, C.J.; the other panel members were Wright, J. and Norris, J.). 
2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1982). COGSA applies of its own force only to shipments 
"to or from ports of the United States, in foreign trade ...... 46 U.S.C. § 1300. 
3. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 763, 768. Ex proprio uigore is defined as "by their own 
force." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522 (5th ed. 1979). 46 U.S.C. § 1301(c) specifically ex-
cludes cargo carried on deck. However, in Sea-Land, paragraph 1 of the bill of lading 
(the clause paramount) stated "This bill of lading shall have effect subject to all of the 
provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act .... The defenses and limitations of said 
Act shall apply to goods whether carried on or under deck." Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 764. 
4. [d. 
5. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768. 
6. [d. The court based its finding on the language contained in the bill of lading, 
which stated, "The word 'package' shall include ... cargo shipped ... on a ... cradle 
.... " [d. at 768. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) limits a carrier's liability to $500 per package, or in 
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The district court had determined that a yacht shipped on the· 
deck of a vessel was forty-five CFUs, therefore liability had been 
assessed at $22,500.7 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that 
the yacht was one "package" and liability should have been lim-
ited to $500.8 
II. FACTS 
Plaintiff, Institute of London Underwriters, was the subro-
gated9 cargo insurer of the shipper of a yacht being transported 
by ocean vessel from Taiwan to Tacoma, Washington!O Sea-
Land Services, Inc., the owners of the SS SEA-LAND MARI-
NER, II the vessel that transported the yacht on its deck, and 
Container Stevedoring, an independent stevedoring contractor, 
which unloaded the yacht in Tacoma, were the defendants. 12 
The yacht was shipped in a cradle on the deck of the SEA-
LAND- MARINER.lS Ordinarily, Sea-Land Services (the carrier) 
would discharge yachts from its vessel to the dock, unless the 
shipper instructed that the yacht be discharged into the water,14 
as in this case. 111 Container Stevedoring removed the yacht from 
its cradle, placed it in slings, and lifted it from the vessel and 
over the water.lS The yacht slipped from the slings, fell into the 
7. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 764. 
8. Id. The district court ruled that the yacht was not a package, and assessed the 
carriers liability at $500 per linear foot, since this was the unit upon which freight was 
charged. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the yacht was a single COGSA 
package. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768. 
9. Subrogated is defined as "the substitution of one person in place of another with 
reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to 
the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights or remedies." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979). See infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
10. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 763. 
11. Brief for Institute of London Underwriters, Institute of London Underwriters v. 
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. 881 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-3701). The vessel was named as 
a defendant in rem, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 9(h). 
12. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 763. 
13. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768 n.5. Both the cradle and the tarpaulin surrounding it 
were provided by the shipper, Angel Marine Industries, at its factory in Taiwan. Brief 
for Sea-Land Services, Inc. at 7, Institute of London Underwriters v. Sea-Land Serv., 
Inc. 881 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-3701). 
14. Pre-Trial Order at 5, Sea-Land (No. C 87-210TB). 
15. Sea-Land 881 F.2d 768 n.5. 
16. Pre-Trial Order at 6, Sea-Land (No. C 87-210TB). 
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water, and sustained approximately $90,000 in damage. I7 
London Underwriters paid the shipper's claim, and subro-
gated to the shipper's rights,18 then sued Sea-Land Services and 
Container Stevedoring for reimbursement. I9 
At trial, London Underwriters argued that because the 
yacht was carried on deck, COGSA's limitation of liability provi-
sion20 did not apply,21 thus they were entitled to full recovery.22 
The district court, however, found that COGSA applied be-
cause Sea-Land had included a "clause paramount"23 in the bill 
of lading, which incorporated COGSA by reference. 24 London 
Underwriters also argued that Container Stevedoring, which was 
not a signatory to the bill of lading, could not claim the benefit 
of COGSA's limitation of liability provision.2~ However, relying 
on paragraph 2 (The Himalaya clause) of the bill of lading, the 
district court ruled that the Himalaya clause26 served to extend 
17. [d. 
18. [d. Pretrial Order at 1, 6, Sea-Land (No. C 87-210TB). The Institute of London 
Underwriters was the insurer of Angel Marine, the manufacturer of the yacht. Having. 
previously paid Angel Marine's claim for the $90,000 damage to the yacht, London Un-
derwriters sought reimbursement for this amount from defendant(s) Sea-Land Services, 
Inc. and Container Stevedoring. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) limits a carrier's liability to $500 per package or CFU. See 
infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
21. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(c) specifically excludes cargo carried on deck. See infra note 63 
and accompanying text. 
22. See Pretrial Order at 8, Sea-Land (No. C 87-210TB). 
23. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 764. A clause paramount is a provision incorporating 
COGSA or a similar statute by reference, when it ordinarily would not apply. E. 
DEUTSCH, MODEL OCEAN BILL OF LADING (1940). In Sea-Land, the clause paramount 
(paragraph 1 of the bill of lading) stated "This bill of lading shall have effect subject to 
all of the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of the United States of America 
... The defenses and limitations of said Act shall apply to goods whether carried on or 
under deck." Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 764. 
24. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 763, 764. 
25. [d. at 767. 
26. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 767. In admiralty law, a Himalaya clause is the language 
used in the contract of carriage to extend the carrier's defenses and limitation of liability 
under COGSA to agents and independent contractors of the carrier. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d 
at 767 n.3. Sea-Land's Himalaya clause (paragraph 2 of the bill of lading) read as follows: 
If it shall be adjudged that any person other than the owner 
or demise charterer (including the master, time charterer, 
agents, stevedores . .. and other independent contractors) is 
the carrier or the bailee of the goods, or is otherwise liable in 
contract or in tort, all rights, exemptions and limitations of 
3
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COGSA's protections to the stevedore as well. 27 Finally, the dis-
trict court determined that although the carrier and stevedore 
were both protected by COGSA, which allows recovery of only 
$500 per package or CFU, the appropriate basis for the CFU cal-
culation was not a package unit, but rather by linear foot. 28 The 
yacht was forty-five feet long, and freight was charged per foot, 
therefore the district court assessed defendants' liability at 
$22,500.29 Defendants appealed, contending that the damages 
had been improperly calculated because the bill of lading listed 
one yacht, which, it was argued, was one CFU.30 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE COMMON LAW 
At common law, a public carrier of goods by sea was abso-
lutely liable for the safe transport and discharge of those goods, 
with very few exceptions.31 Further, even if the cause of damage 
to cargo fell within an exception, the carrier was still liable if 
negligent.32 In order for a shipper to collect damages from a car-
rier for lost or injured cargo, two things were required: proof of 
delivery to the carrier of undamaged goods, and non-delivery or 
delivery of damaged goods.aa Thus, the common law, in both 
England and the United States, treated the carrier as both the 
transporter and insurer of goods carried by sea. 34 If a shipper 
liability ... shall be available to such other persons. 
Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 767 (emphasis added). 
27. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 764. 
28. See Id. at 764. The district court held that, "as a matter of law, the customary 
freight unit is the unit upon which the charge for freight is computed." See Id. (As the 
district court opinion was unpublished, all references herein refer to the Ninth Circuit's 
recitations of the district court opinion.) 
29. See Id. ($500 x 45 feet). 
30. Brief for Sea-Land Services, Inc. at 19-20, Institute of London Underwriters v. 
Sea-Land Serv., Inc. 881 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 88-3701). 
31. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 139 (2d ed. 1975) 
[hereinafter GILMORE]. The common law exceptions included acts of God or the public 
enemy, negligence of the shipper, or inherent vice (defective condition prior to shipment) 
of the cargo. I d. 
32. I d. at 140. 
33. Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 22-23 (1858) (common carrier 
absolutely liable for goods in his custody, absent act of God or other exempted cause). 
34. Id. at 23. The Court stated, "Common carriers by water, like common carriers 
by land, in the absence of any legislative provisions prescribing a ditferent rule, are also, 
in general insurers, and liable in all events and for every loss or damage, however occa-
sioned, unless it happen by the act of God, or the public enemy .... " Propeller Niagara, 
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successfully proved his prima facie case, the carrier was liable 
for all damages to the cargo, regardless of fault or the amount of 
damage. 311 The common law recognized no limitation of liability, 
unless damage to cargo occurred due to an Act of God or public 
enemy.36 
To purportedly remain free from liability in the event cargo 
was damaged, shipowners began to carve out various "excep-
tions" in their bills of lading.37 By the end of the 19th century, 
the list of "exceptions" had grown so extensive that nearly all 
risks of loss were placed upon the shipper.ss In the event of loss 
or damage to cargo, the shipper could turn only to his marine 
insurer for relief, since the carrier had exempted itself from lia-
bility for virtually all causes of loss or damage.39 Thus, in less 
62 U.8. at 23. 
35.Id. 
36. Id. at 26. 
37. Caterpillar Overseas 8.A. v. 8.8. Expediter, 318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(bills of lading became contracts of adhesion controlled by carriers.) See infra note 38 
and accompanying text. 
38. Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Lines, 494 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1974). 
39. See Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Lines, 494 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(quoting the late ,James A. Quinby, Esq.'s "Them Damaged Cargo Blues"). 
I t is much to be regretted 
That your goods are slightly wetted 
But our lack of liability is plain, 
For our latest Bill of Lading 
Which is proof against evading 
Bears exceptions for sea water, rust and rain 
Also sweat, contamination 
Fire and all depreciation 
That we've ever seen or heard of on a ship 
And our due examination 
Which we made at destination 
8hows your cargo much improved by the trip 
I t really is a crime 
That you're wasting all your time 
For our Bill of Lading clauses made it plain 
That from ullage, rust or seepage 
Water, sweat or just plain leakage 
Acts of God, restraining of princes, theft or war 
Loss, damage or detention 
Lockout, strike or circumvention 
Blockade, interdict or loss twixt ship and shore, 
Quarantine or heavy weather 
Fog and rain or both together 
We're protected from all of these and many more 
And it's very plain to see 
That our liability 
5
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than a hundred years, the risk of loss for cargo damage had 
shifted almost entirely from the carrier to the shipper.4o 
B. THE HARTER ACT 
The Harter Act41 passed by Congress in 1893, represents a 
compromise between the carriers, who wanted the shipper to 
bear the risk of cargo loss or damage, and the shippers, who 
wanted the carriers to assume liability.42 The Act allocates risks 
of shipping and lessens the carrier's superior bargaining power 
by making unlawful many of the exculpatory clauses that previ-
ously were inserted into bills of lading.'3 However, the Act ex-
plicitly preserves the common law liability exceptions of acts Of 
God, perils of the sea, or shipper's negligence." 
The Act applies to all shipments via water carrier within the 
United States, as well as to foreign shipments docked domesti-
cally, both prior to loading, and after unloading of cargo.'Ci It 
also requires the carrier to issue a bill of lading specifying the 
quantity of goods received.'e It provides for no statute of limita-
[d. 
As regards your claim is absolutely nil 
So try your underwriter 
He's a friendly sort of blighter 
And is pretty sure to grin and foot the bill. 
40. Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expediter, 318 F.2d 720, 722 (2d Cir. 1963) 
(historical shifting of risk of loss allocation explained). 
41. The Harter Act, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 
190-96 (1982 & Supp. v. 1987». See Caterpillar Overseas, 318 F.2d at 722. 
42. Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 422 F.2d 7, 11 (2d 
Cir. 1969) (purpose of the Harter Act is to achieve a fair balance between carriers' and 
shippers' interests). 
43. See Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Lines, 494 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1974) 
(Harter Act serves to invalidate most liability exceptions). For example, Harter Act § 1 
(46 U.S.C. § 190) renders any attempt by the carrier to exonerate himself from liability 
for negligence null and void. Harter Act § 2 (46 U.S.C. § 191) prohibits the carrier from 
including a clause in a bill of lading that purports to relieve the carrier from his duty of 
due diligence in maintaining his vessel. 
44. 46 U.S.C. § 192 provides. in part: "If the owner of any vessel transporting mer-
chandise or property to or from any port in the United States shall exercise due diligence 
to make ... the vessel ... seaworthy ... neither the vessel, her owner or owners, shall 
become or be held responsible for damage or loss resulting from ... damages of the sea, 
acts of God ...... 
45. 46 U.S.C. § 191. See A. KNAUTH, ON OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 121-22 (1941). 
46. 46 U.S.C. § 193 provides in part: "It shall be the duty of the owner .. , of any 
vessel ... to issue to shippers of any lawful merchandise a bill of lading ...... 
6
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tions,47 but the equitable doctrine of laches may be applied.48 
Carriers may impose a time limit for negligence suits against 
them, and this will be enforced if the limitation is reasonable.49 
Finally, the Act denies exoneration for the carrier's naviga-
tional errors if he has failed to exercise due diligence to provide 
a seaworthy vessel, even if an unseaworthy vessel is not the 
cause of loss or damage. lio This provision denying exoneration is 
known as the "unseaworthiness doctrine," and was first applied 
by the Supreme Court in The Isis,lil a case that involved a vessel 
stranding caused by the vessel's unseaworthiness.1i2 
C. THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS By SEA ACT 
1. Overview 
The Harter Act was greeted with approval by foreign na-
tions,lia and it served as the impetus for international legislation 
regulating shipments between foreign ports.1i4 At an interna-
tional diplomatic conference in Brussels in 1924, legislation 
known as the Hague Rules was formally adopted.1i1i Subse-
quently, most remaining nations engaged in maritime commerce 
47. See P.P.G. Indus. v. Ashland Oil Co., 527 F.2d 502, 505 (3rd Cir. 1975). See 46 
U.S.C. § 1303(6). In contrast, COGSA contains a one-year statute of limitations for the 
shipper to bring suit against the carrier for loss or damage to cargo. 
48. P.P.G. Indus. v. Ashland Oil Co., 527 F.2d 502, 505 (3rd Cir. 1975). (Harter Act 
has no statute of limitations and laches may apply). 
49. The Queen of the Pacific, 180 U.S. 49, 53-58 (1901) (reasonableness of time limit 
depends on object of notice and length of voyage and thirty day time limit held 
reasonable). 
50. 46 U.S.C. § 191 provides, in part: "It shall not be lawful for any ... owner to 
insert in any bill of lading ... any covenant or agreement whereby the obligations of the 
owner ... to make said vessel seaworthy ... be lessened, weakened, or avoided." 
51. May v. Hamburg - Amerikanische Packerfahrt Aktiengesellschaft (The Isis), 290 
U.S. 333 (1933) (exemption from liability resulting from faults or errors in navigation or 
management of the vessel is conditioned upon the carrier's exercise of due diligence to 
provide a seaworthy ship both at the commencement of the voyage and at any intermedi-
ate stage at which he took control). 
52. The Isis, 290 U.S. at 352. The section of the Harter Act at issue in The Isis was 
46 U.S.C. § 192 which provides, in part: "neither the vessel, her owner ... shall become 
or be held responsible for damage, or loss resulting from faults or errors in 
navigation .... " 
53. A. KNAUTH, ON OCEAN BILLS OF LADING, 99-110 (1941). 
54.Id. 
55. Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to 
Bills of Lading. Aug. 25, 1924, 51 STAT. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155. 
7
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adopted the Hague Rules.1I6 In the United States, the Hague 
Rules were incorporated into domestic law with the enactment 
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) in 1936.117 
COGSA, like the Harter Act, serves to allocate the risk of 
loss for cargo damage.1I6 Unlike the Harter Act, COGSA is appli-
cable only to shipments to or from the United States in foreign, 
rather than domestic trade.1I9 The Harter Act and COGSA func-
tion concurrently.60 In contracts for domestic carriage of goods 
(between Unite'd States ports) COGSA expressly provides that 
the parties to the bill of lading may incorporate COGSA by ref-
etence, even when the Harter Act would ordinarily apply.61 
When a bill issued for carriage between ports of the United 
56. The following nations have adopted the Hague Rules: Angola, Algeria, Argen-
tina, Australia, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, 
Fiji, Finland, France, the Gambia, German Dem. Rep., Fed. Rep. Germany, Ghana, Gre-
nada, Guyana, Hungary, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Ku-
wait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritius, Monaco, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland and Free City of Danzig, Portugal, 
Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Rep., Tanzania, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Tonga, Trini-
dad and Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Yugoslavia. 2A BENEDICT ON 
ADMIRALTY 1:14 (M. Cohen 7th ed. 1989). 
57. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, ch. 229, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936) (codified as amended 
at 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1982». Encyclopedia Britannica v. S.S. Hong Kong Producer, 
422 F.2d 7, 11 (2nd Cir. 1969). (Congress' initial goal in its adoption of COGSA was to 
promote uniformity in maritime commerce). See A. KNAUTH. ON OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 
99-110 (1941). 
58. Institute of London Underwriters v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. 881 F.2d 761, 763 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
59. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300 and 1312. Section 1312 provides, in part: 
This chapter shall apply to all contracts for carriage of goods 
by sea to or from the United States in foreign trade. As used 
in this chapter the term 'United States' includes its districts, 
territories, and possessions .... The term "Foreign Trade" 
means the transport of goods between the ports of the United 
States and ports of foreign countries. 
60. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 further provides: 
61. [d. 
Nothing in this Act shall be held to apply to contracts for car-
riage of goods by sea between any port of the United States or 
its possessions or its possessions and any other port of the 
United States or its possessions. Provided, however, that any 
bill of lading or similar document of title which is evidence of 
a contract for the carriage of goods between such ports, con-
taining an express statement that it shall be subject to the 
provisions of this Act, shall be subjected hereto as fully as if 
subject hereto by the express provisions of this Act . ... (em-
phasis added). 
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States incorporates COGSA by reference, it is known as the 
"coastwise option."62 Further, even in situations where COGSA 
expressly does not apply,63 the parties may make its provisions 
contractual by incorporating COGSA by reference,64 through the 
use of a "clause paramount."611 
COGSA is applicable only to contracts of carriage between 
shippers and carriers,66 but its protections may be extended to 
third parties, such as stevedores or other agents of the carrier, 
through a valid "Himalaya clause."67 Unlike the Harter Act, 
COGSA applies only after loading, and prior to discharge of the 
cargo.68 Thus COGSA, while partially superseding the Harter 
Act, expressly preserves its application.69 
COGSA contains sixteen separate and distinct exoneration 
62. See e.g. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. California Stevedore and Ballast 
Co., 559 F.2d 1173, 1175 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) (coastwise incorporation of COGSA into bill 
of lading renders it ex proprio vigore; inconsistent terms invalid). Vessels "plying coast-
wise" are those engaged in domestic trade, or plying between port and port in the United 
States. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 233 (5th ed. 1979). 
63. See 46 U.S.C. § 1301(c) which specifically excludes "live animals and cargo which 
by the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and is so carried." 
64. 46 U.S.C. § 1312 permits this option. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying 
text. 
65. See Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 764. A clause paramount is a provision incorporating 
COGSA or a similar statute by reference, when it ordinarily would not apply. E. 
DEUTSCH. MODEL OCEAN BILL OF LADING 1 (1940). 
66. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(b) provides in part: "The term 'contract of carriage' applies 
only to contractors of carriage covered by a bill of lading ... regulates the relations 
between a carrier and holder of the same." 
67. See Carriage of Goods by Sea: Application of the Himalaya Clause to Sub-
delegees of the Carrier, 2 MARITIME LAWYER 91 (1977), which explains the origin of the 
Himalaya clause: (term derives from an earlier British case involving the vessel HIMA-
LA YA, Adler v. Dickson, 1 Q.B. 158 (1954)). See Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 767. (In admi-
ralty law, a Himalaya clause is the language used to extend the carrier's defenses and 
limitations of liability under COGSA to his agents and independant contractors). 
68. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(e) provides: "[t]he term 'carriage of goods' covers the period 
from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from 
the ship." But, its protections may be extended both prior to loading and after discharge 
through a valid Himalaya clause. See Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 767. Absent a Himalaya 
clause, however, the Harter Act governs the rights and duties of the parties prior to 
loading, and after discharge. 46 U.S.C. § 1311. 
69. 46 U.S.C. § 1311 provides: 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as superseding any part 
of [46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (The Harter Act)] ... insofar as they 
relate to the duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of the ship 
or carrier prior to the time \yhen the goods are loaded on or 
after the time they are discharged from the ship. 
9
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clauses70 which, if any cause contained within a clause is proven 
to be the source of cargo loss or damage, relieves the carrier 
from liability, if he is not negligent.71 A further provision known 
as the "Q" clause exonerates the carrier from liability for any 
other cause arising without his fault or neglect.72 
2. Limitation of Liability 
Unlike the Harter Act, COGSA contains an express limita-
tion of liability provision that benefits the carrier.7S This provi-
70. 46 U.s.c. § 1304(2)(a)-(p) provides as follows: 
(2) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for 
loss or damage arising or resulting from -
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master ... or servants of the 
carrier in the navigation or management of the ship; 
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the 
carrier; 
(c) Perils, dangers, accidents of the sea or other navigable 
water; 
(d) Act of God; 
(e) Act of war; 
(f) Act of public enemies; 
(g) Arrest or restraint of princes, rules, or people, or seizure 
under legal process; 
(h) Quarantine restrictions; 
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods ... 
(j) Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labor from 
whatever cause ... 
(k) Riots and civil commotions; 
(I) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea; 
(m) Wastage in bulk or weight ... arising from inherent defect 
. . . or vice of the goods; 
(n) Insufficiency of packing; 
(0) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks; 
(p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence. 
71. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(3) provides, "The shipper shall not be responsible for any loss 
or damage sustained by the carrier or the ship arising or resulting from any cause with-
out the act, fault, or neglect of the shipper, his agents, or his servants." 
72. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(q) provides: 
Any other cause arising without the actual fault and privity of 
the carrier ... or agents and servants of the carrier, but the 
burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of 
this exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity 
of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants 
of the carrier contributed to the los8 or damage. 
73. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) provides in part: "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in 
any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the trans-
portation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package ... or ... customary freight 
unit .... " 
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sion has been the subject of much litigation.74 It provides that a 
carrier who has given the shipper a "fair opportunity to declare 
a higher value"7Ii for the cargo is entitled to limit his liability to 
$500 per package or "customary freight unit" (CFU)76 for cargo 
loss or damage. 
3. What is a "package" or CFU? 
The courts have defined "package" and CFU in a variety of 
ways.77 Generally, the parties will define "package" in the bill of 
lading. A typical description of the shipment on a bill of lading 
may read: "one container, said to contain 99 bales."78 In Pannell 
v. United States Lines,79 the Second Circuit held that when the 
bill of lading so stated, a yacht carried on deck was one package, 
thus limiting the carrier's liability accordingly.80 
74. See Croft & Scully Co. v. MN Skulptor Vucketich, 664 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(district court held a container was a "package"; Fifth Circuit reversed, but remanded 
for question as to whether container was a CFU). Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc. v. 
SS Puerto Rico, 607 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1979) (an electrical transformer weighing 47,700 
pounds was a "package," thus carrier's liability limited to $500 for damage). Isbrandtsen 
Co. Inc. v. United States, 201 F.2d 281 (2nd Cir. 1953) (an entire locomotive was one 
CFU, thus limiting carrier's liability for its destruction to $500). Stirnimann v. The San 
Diego, 148 F.2d 141 (2nd Cir. 1945) (a machine shipped in 126 pieces was held to re-
present 126 "packages"). 
75. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. This language, not part of 
COGSA's text, was articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific 
Line, 494 F.2d 438, 443 (9th Cir. 1974). 
76. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5). See supra note 73 for the relevant text. 
77. See e.g. Vegas v. Compania Anonima Venezolana, 720 F.2d 629 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(each of 109 boxes of automobile parts were a single package for COGSA purposes de-
spite the fact that they were shipped in two master cartons built on pallets); Croft & 
Scully Co. v. MN Skulptor Vucketich, 664 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 1982) (container supplied 
by carrier was not a COGSA "package"); Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc. v. S.S. 
Puerto Rico, 607 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1979) (47,700 pound transformer was one COGSA 
package); Cameco, Inc. v. S.S. American Legion, 514 F.2d 1291 (2nd Cir. 1974) (pallet 
containing 100 cartons of canned hams was one CFU); Pannell v. United States Lines 
Co., 263 F.2d 497 (2nd Cir. 1959) (yacht shipped on deck of a vessel while lashed in a 
cradle, was a COGSA "package"). 
78. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 804 (2nd Cir. 1971) (held 
a container is not a package where the separate packages in the container are so 
described). 
79. 263 F.2d 497 (2nd Cir. 1959). 
80. Pannell, 263 F.2d at 498. 
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4. "The Fair Opportunity to Declare" Doctrine 
The $500 package limitation applies only if the shipper is 
given a fair opportunity to declare a higher value for the cargo.81 
Precisely what constitutes "fair opportunity" is still an area of 
dispute among the circuits.82 While the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue in the context of COGSA, limitation of lia-
bility clauses for railroad shipments have been upheld.83 
In New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad v. 
Nothnagle,84 a case involving lost passenger luggage, the Su-
preme Court adopted the fair opportunity requirement. 811 The 
passenger sued the railroad in state court and was awarded $615, 
the full value of the lost luggage.8s The railroad company ap-
pealed, contending that its liability was limited to $25, due to 
the applicable tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.87 The Supreme Court conceded that the tariff applied, 
but held that the passenger was entitled to full recovery, since 
she lacked actual knowledge of the limitation.88 The Court found 
that passengers should have a "fair opportunity" to choose be-
81. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5). See Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Lines, 494 F.2d 438, 
443 (9th Cir. 1974) (fair opportunity criteria discussed). 
82. See e.g. Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Lines, 494 F.2d 438, 443 (9th Cir. 
1974) (COGSA requires a shipper be provided with a fair opportunity to choose between 
a higher or lower liability by paying a correspondingly greater or lesser charge). In Tess-
ler, the Ninth Circuit found that shipper will not be deemed to have been given a "fair 
opportunity" where such opportunity was not presented on the face of the bill of lading. 
Tessler, 494 F.2d at 443 (quoting New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Nothnagle, 
346 U.S. 128, 135 (1953). In contrast, see Brown & Root, Inc. v. M/V. Peisander, 648 
F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1981) ("fair opportunity" given when COGSA incorporated by refer-
ence) and Cincinnati Milicron Ltd. v. M/V American Legend, 804 F.2d 837 (4th Cir. 
1986) (short form bill of lading incorporating COGSA by reference provides shipper with 
fair opportunity to declare a higher value). 
83. See e.g. Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 236 U.S. 278 (1915) (carrier's liability 
limited to $50, as specified in the bill of lading, since shipper given fair opportunity to 
declare full $15,000 value of damaged automobiles.); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Robin-
son, 233 U.S. 173 (1914) (carrier's liability for damaged horse limited to $100, since ship-
per was aware of written limitation of liability provision of contract of carriage); Boston 
& Me. R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97 (1914) (where tariff rates published, notice of fair 
opportunity to declare a higher value for passenger luggage deemed sufficient). 
84. 346 U.S. 128 (1953) (carrier must give passenger fair opportunity to declare 
higher value in order to limit carrier's liability to less than actual value of loss 
sustained). 
85. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. at 135. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 135. 
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tween higher or lower liability89 before a carrier can limit recov-
ery to an amount that is less than the actual 10ss.90 Thus, the 
Court articulated the fair opportunity requirement but no test 
was provided for its determination.91 
5. The Ninth Circuit's Development of "Fair Opportunity" 
Tessler Bros. (B.C.) v. Italpacific Lines92 was the first Ninth 
Circuit decision to apply the fair opportunity requirement ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Nothnagle. In Tessler, the 
holder of the bill of lading sued the carrier for damage to its 
industrial dry cleaning machine.93 The Ninth Circuit stated that 
the carrier had to give the shipper a fair opportunity to choose 
between a higher and lower liability by paying a correspondingly 
higher or lower freight charge.94 
In Grace Lines, Inc. v. Todd Shipyards Corp.,95 the Ninth 
Circuit extended the fair opportunity requirement to the car-
rier's agents.96 The Ninth Circuit held that, if a shipper had 
been given a fair opportunity to declare a higher value, the car-
rier could extend COGSA's protections to third parties through 
a valid Himalaya clause.97 
In Carman Tool & Abrasives v. Evergreen Lines,98 the 
Ninth Circuit refined its decision in Tessler, and required notice 
to the shipper of the "fair opportunity" in language equivalent 
89. Nothnagle, 346 u.s. at 135. The Court stated: "[O)nly by granting its customers 
a fair opportunity to choose between the higher or lower liability by paying a corre-
spondingly greater or lesser charge can a carrier lawfully limit recovery to an amount less 
than the actual loss sustained." Id. 
90. Id. at 136. 
91. See id. at 136. 
92. 494 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1974). 
93. Tessler, 494 F.2d at 440. 
94. Tessler, 494 F.2d at 443. The Ninth Circuit stated "the carrier must give the 
shipper a fair opportunity to choose between a higher or lower liability by paying a cor-
responding greater or lesser charge." Tessler, 494 F.2d at 443 (quoting Nothnagle, 346 
U.S. 128, 135 (1953». 
95. 500 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974) (agent of carrier can claim COGSA protection if 
shipper given fair opportunity). 
96. Grace Lines, Inc. v. Todd Shipyards, 500 F.2d 361, 369. 
97. Id. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
98. 871 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1989) (fair opportunity requires operative language of to 
COGSA appear on face of bill of lading). 
13
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to COGSA's applicable provision.99 Further, the court declared 
that, if a bill of lading contains the operative language of 
COGSA,loO it would be prima facie evidence that the shipper 
was given the requisite fair opportunity to declare a higher 
value.101 
6. COGSA as a Contractual Term 
Even when COGSA does not apply ex proprio vigore, the 
parties to a bill of lading are still free to incorporate it by refer-
ence.102 When COGSA is incorporated by reference, it has the 
same effect as if it applied ex proprio vigore. loa 
The Ninth Circuit has held that, when COGSA is incorpo-
rated in contracts for domestic carriage, where otherwise the 
Harter Act would apply,104 all terms inconsistent with COGSA 
are invalid. 1011 The Third/os Fourth/07 and Fifthl08 Circuits, 
however, have held to the contrary, and have permitted both 
COGSA and inconsistent terms to be construed as ordinary 
terms of contract.109 
99. Carman Tool, 871 F.2d at 899. The Ninth Circuit refused to extend the notice 
requirement to those not having direct dealings with the carrier. Id. at 901. 
100. Carman Tool, 871 F.2d at 901. The court stated that the terms of 46 U.S.C. § 
1304(5) should be legibly recited on the bill of lading. Id. See supra note 73 for partial 
text. 
101. Carman Tool, 871 F.2d at 899 (citing Nemeth v. General S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d at 
609, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1982)). Nemeth v. General 8.S. Corp. Ltd., 694 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 
1982) (microscopic and illegible terms in a bill of lading did not provide shipper with fair 
opportunity); Pan Am World Airways v. California Stevedore and Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 
1173 (9th Cir. 1977) (bill of lading actually denied the opportunity to declare a higher 
value and was declared void). 
102. See 46 U.S.C. § 1312. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
103. 46 U.S.C. § 1312. 
104. See 46 U.S.C. § 190-96. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
105. See Pan Am World Airways v. California Stevedore & Ballast Co., 559 F.2d 
1173 (9th Cir. 1977) (in contracts for domestic carriage, where COGSA is incorporated by 
reference, terms inconsistent with COGSA are invalid). 
106. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Ashland Oil Co., 527 F.2d 502, 507 (3rd Cir. 1975) 
(COGSA may apply by contract, but only to the extent that parties manifested intent 
that it should apply). 
107. See Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc. v. 8.S. Puerto Rico, 607 F.2d 322, 328 
(4th Cir. 1979) (in contracts for domestic carriage, where COGSA's provisions agreed to 
by parties, inconsistent terms given force as well). 
108. See Ralston Purina v. Barge Juneau, 619 F. 2d 374, 375-76 (5th Cir. 1980) (in 
contract for domestic carriage, where parties incorporated only portions of COGSA, 
terms inconsistent with excluded sections may govern). 
109. See supra notes 105-08. 
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The circuits have been more uniform in their treatment of 
COGSA's terms where foreign shipments are involved.11o In 
North River Insurance Co. v. Fed-Sea/Fed Pac-Lines,lll the 
Ninth Circuit stated that "we reject the view that COGSA 
preempts all contract terms when its sole force is by incorpora-
tion into a contract for foreign transportation."112 In North 
River, the bill of lading specified Canada as the forum for dis-
putes.11S The Ninth Circuit upheld the foreign forum 
provision. 114 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. INCORPORATION OF COGSA 
In Institute of London Underwriters v. Sea-Land Services, 
Inc.,m the Ninth Circuit held that terms inconsistent with 
COGSA, but which are otherwise valid contract terms, may be 
given force concurrent with COGSA.ll6 The court had previously 
articulated this finding in North River Insurance Co. v. Fed.-
Sea/Fed.-Pac. Linesy7 In North River, the Ninth Circuit en-
forced a foreign jurisdiction clause118 where COGSA did not ap-
110. See Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor Vucketich, 664 F.2d 1277, 1280 (5th 
Cir. 1982) (when COGSA's terms are merely contractual, judicial interpretation is per-
missible); North River Ins. Co. v. Fed.-SeaIFed.-Pac. Line, 647 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(foreign jurisdiction clause upheld when COGSA applied by contract); But see Indussa 
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967) (when COGSA applies as a matter of 
law, foreign jurisdiction clause inappropriate); Pannell v. United States Lines Co., 263 
F.2d 497 (2nd Cir. 1959) (terms inconsistent with COGSA treated as ordinary contract 
terms). . 
111. 647 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1981). 
112. North River Ins. Co. v. Fed-SeaIFed-Pac Lines, 647 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
113. Jd. at 987. Ordinarily, the United States is the chosen forum for disputes aris-
ing out of contracts made in the United States, although COGSA contains no prohibition 
against choosing an alternate forum. Id. at 989. 
114. Id. at 990. 
115. Institute of London Underwriters v. Sea-Land Serv., 881 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
116. Sea-Land Seru., 881 F.2d at 763 (9th Cir. 1989). The court held that "terms 
inconsistent with COGSA, but which are otherwise valid contract term:s, may be given 
force where COGSA is incorporated into a contract for foreign carriage to which it would 
not apply ex proprio uigore." Id. at 766. 
117. 647 F.2d 975 (9th Cir. 1981) (foreign jurisdiction clause upheld where COGSA 
incorporated by contract). 
118. North Riuer, 647 F.2d at 990. The bill of lading specified Canada as the forum 
for disputes. [d. at 987. 
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ply ex proprio vigore, but was incorporated by contract.l19 
In Sea-Land, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the finding 
in North River was dicta and thus did not control in the instant 
case.120 However, the court stated that North River indicated a 
direction for Ninth Circuit law,l21 and accordingly allowed the 
parties in Sea-Land to define "goods" contrary to COGSA's 
definition. 122 
B. OPPORTUNITY To DECLARE HIGHER VALUE 
The Ninth Circuit found that the shipper had been given 
and waived an opportunity to declare a higher value for its 
cargo.123 The court found that the bill of lading,124 expressly pro-
vided the shipper with the requisite fair opportunity.12C1 
The court stated that if a bill of lading contains notice to 
the shipper of an opportunity to declare a higher cargo value 
than $500 per package or CFU, in language equivalent to section 
1304(5) of COGSA,t26 he is bound by the $500 per package or 
CFU limitation unless he declares a higher value.127 The court 
noted that this position had been articulated in Carman Tool & 
Abrasives, Inc. v. Evergreen Lines 128 and Tessler Bros. (B.C,) v. 
Italpacific Lines129 and supported the determination that the 
119. [d. at 987. 
120. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 766. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(c) specifically excludes cargo carried on deck (as the yacht 
in Sea-Land was). 
123. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 766. 
124. [d. Sea-Land's bill of lading contained both a valuation and a declared value 
clause. The valuation clause (paragraph 17) stated, in part, "In the event of loss, damage, 
or delay to or in connection with goods exceeding an actual value to the equivalent of 
$500 ... per package or ... per shipping unit ... unless the nature and higher value of 
the goods have been declared by the shipper herein and extra charge paid as provided in 
Carrier's tariff." Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 766. 
The Declared Value Clause (clause 23) appeared on the face of the bill of lading. It 
provided, "(23) Declared value $ If shipper enters a value, carriers' "package" 
limitations [sic) of liability does not apply and the ad valorem rate will be charged." [d. 
125. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 766. 
126. 46 U.S.C. 1304(5). See supra note 73 for full text. 
127. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 766. 
128. 871 F.2d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1989). See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying 
text. 
129. 494 F.2d 438, 443 (9th Cir. 1974). See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying 
text. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss1/6
1991] ADMIRALTY LAW 35 
burden of proof shifted to the shipper to show that fair opportu-
nity to declare a higher value for the yacht was denied. 130 
After considering the language within paragraph 17 of the 
carrier's bill of lading,l3l the court held that the shipper failed to 
meet this burden of proof, because the bill of lading explicitly 
limited liability and thus, the $500 limitation was found to 
apply. 132 
C. EXTENSION OF COGSA's LIMITATION OF LIABILITY To THE 
STEVEDORE 
The Ninth Circuit found the bill of lading effectively ex-
tended COGSA's protections to the stevedore as well as the car-
rier under the bill's Himalaya clause.133 In the Ninth Circuit, a 
valid Himalaya clause had been previously found to extend the 
benefits of a bill of lading to stevedores when that intent is 
clearly expressed.ls• In Sea-Land, the Ninth Circuit found an 
expression of the requisite intentl31i in the Himalaya clause of 
the bill of lading.136 
D. CLASSIFICATION OF THE YACHT FOR CALCULATING LIMITATION 
AMOUNT 
The Ninth Circuit found that the yacht was one package, 
and not forty-five CFU's as previously determined by the dis-
Id. 
130. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 766. 
131. Id. Paragraph 17 provided, in part, 
132. Id. 
In the event of loss, damage or delay to or in connection with 
goods exceeding an actual value to the equivalent of $500 ... 
per package or ... per shipping unit ... unless the nature and 
higher value of the goods have been declared by the shipper 
herein and extra charge paid as provided in Carrier's tariff .... 
133. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 767. 
134. Id. (citing Tessler Bros., 494 F.2d at 442). 
135. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 767. 
136. Id. The Himalaya clause read, "If it shall be adjudged that any person other 
than the owner . .. (including the master ... agents, stevedores . .. and other indepen-
dent contractors) is the carrier or the bailee of the goods ... all rights, exemptions, and 
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trict court.137 Relying on Pannell v. United States Lines CO./38 
the court concluded that "since the shipper could have declared 
the value of his yacht and had full protection against damage by 
paying a higher freight rate, we cannot regard the $500 limita-
tion as in the nature of a trap."13D The Ninth Circuit held that 
as the bill of lading clearly defined "package" to include yachts 
carried on deck,140 the yacht was a COGSA "package."141 Ac-
cordingly, the shipper was entitled to recover only $500 and not 
the $22,500 as determined by the lower court. 142 
V. CRITIQUE 
In Sea-Land, the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the Sec-
ond I43 and Fifth144 Circuits, declaring that in a contract for for-
eign carriage where COGSA would not apply unless it is incorpo-
rated by contract, terms inconsistent with COGSA may 
nonetheless be given effect.14G The court formally adopted the 
dicta expressed in North River Ins. Co. v. Fed-Sea/Fed-Pac 
Lines, when it held that "we reject the view that COGSA 
preempts all contract terms when its sole force is by incorpora-
tion into a contract for foreign transportation."146 With this 
holding, the court furthered Congress' initial goal for the adop-
tion of COGSA, promoting uniformity in maritime commerce. 147 
Both the facts in Sea-Land 148 and Ninth Circuit prece-
137. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 767. 
138. 263 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1959). 
139. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768 (quoting Pannell v. United States Lines Co., 263 
F.2d 497, 498 (2d Cir. 1959)). 
140. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768. The bill of lading listed "package" to include 
"cargo shipped in a cradle" (as the yacht was). [d. 
141. [d. 
142. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768. 
143. See Pannell v. United States Lines Co., 263 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1959) (terms 
inconsistent with COGSA treated as ordinary contract terms). 
144. See Croft & Scully Co. v. M/V Skulptor Vucketich, 664 F.2d 1277 (5th Cir. 
1982) (when COGSA's terms are merely contractual, judicial interpretation is 
permissible). 
145. Institute of London Underwriters v. Sea-Land Serv., 881 F.2d 761, at 763 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
146. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 765 (quoting North River Ins. Co. v. Fed-Sea/Fed-Pac 
Lines, 647 F.2d 985, at 989.). 
147. Uniformity was Congress' goal in its initial adoption of COG SA. A. KNAUTH, ON 
OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 99-110 (1942). 
148. Sea-Land, 881 F,2d at 763. 
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dentl49 clearly dictated that the court would find that the bill of 
lading validly incorporated COGSA. This finding represents no 
departure from the court's previous positions; rather, it reiter-
ates and approves of the common practice of using a clause par-
amount to incorporate COGSA by referencelllo as the means to 
accomplish this end. 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit correctly affirmed the district 
court's application of COGSA to limit damages liability. Fur-
ther, the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the district court's calcula-
tion of the customary freight unit was also proper. Given the 
case facts, and the relevant language of the bill of lading,m it is 
clear that the district court erred in its calculation that the 
yacht was forty-five CFUs, since the bill of lading stated that 
"package" included cargo shipped in a cradle.1CI2 The reduction 
in the amount of liability to $500, (representing a single COGSA 
package) is supported by an earlier parallel case in the Second 
Circuit, which also determined that one yacht comprised one 
package,11I3 as the Ninth Circuit noted. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This decision follows sound principles of contract and mari-
time law, and logically extends the principle of uniformity in 
modern maritime trade. The court provides appropriate freedom 
to the parties to define their contract terms within COGSA's ap-
plicable limits,11I4 yet still corrected the erroneous finding by the 
district court regarding the package limitation. 1l1li 
While this finding represents a financial loss to the subro-
gated insurer, such a loss is an inherent risk in maritime com-
149. See Nemeth v. General S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1982); Tessler Bros. 
(B.C.) Ltd. v. Italpacific Line, 494 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1974); Grace Line, Inc. v. Todd 
Shipyards Corp., 500 F.2d 361 (9th Cir. 1974). See supra, notes 92-101 and accompany-
ing text. 
150. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 764. 
151. See supra note 131. 
152. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768. The specific definition of package included the 
yacht which was shipped in an on-deck cradle. [d. 
153. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768. See Pannell v. United States Lines Co., 263 F.2d 
497 (2d Cir. 1959) (yacht is one package). 
154. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-13, generally, and discussion in Part III, C for application. 
155. Sea-Land, 881 F.2d at 768. 
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merce, and is clearly allocated by COGSA's own terms, which 
specifically limit a carrier's liability.1I16 Further, although the 
subrogated insurer suffers financially, he is still free to require 
his insured to declare a higher value on future shipments, thus 
lessening the chances of his sustaining such a loss on subsequent 
claims. Alternatively, he may raise premiums to cover these 
losses. 
Sharon Stover* 
156. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5). See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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